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ARTICLE
____________________________________________________________________________________

Illusion and Value, or Marcel Mauss on Alienability and
Inalienability
Marcos Lanna
Departamento de Ciências Sociais
Universidade Federal de São Carlos
BRAZIL
This paper is at variance from much of the thinking of Terence Turner, but it is also inspired
by him. Dedicating a paper to Terry that contains so many ideas with which he would
probably have disagreed deserves some explanation.1 Terry was an exceptional teacher and
dissertation advisor on many counts, but also an outstanding debater. He taught me how
intellectual dialogue implies respect and understanding of the other discussant’s perspectives.
Furthermore, beyond any divergence, it will also be clear that this paper shares many of
Terry’s theoretical concerns, especially with Marx and French structuralism and topics such
as the relation between infra- and superstructures. It owes a lot to Terry in many other ways.
In a sense, I feel I owe him the freedom to be myself, while reading many of the same
authors that he cherished from a perspective that differs from his. But that does not mean I
do not use some of his insights. His encouragement of intellectual autonomy was clear to me
since the first interview I had with him before I became a Chicago graduate student in 1982,
and this impression was renewed whenever we discussed ideas again, as when he wrote me a
long letter detailing his reading of a paper (Graeber and Lanna 2005) that David Graeber and
I had dedicated to him.
Terry was also a person without futile vanities. He gave me the impression he was
worried whether people understood what he wrote, not whether they quoted him. Even
when he is not explicitly quoted here, Terry is implicitly present in every single line. Many of
the questions presented here were discussed with him, and, although the interest he
manifested in them may not have been a function of our agreement, it was certainly a
reflection of our mutual understanding.
My objective here will be to highlight Marcel Mauss’s emphasis on the inalienability of
the gift, using Marx’s notion of alienation as a backdrop. Both Marx and Mauss, each in his
own way, reveal specific complementary aspects of exchange. Since I am not the first, nor
will I be the last, to draw on Mauss and Marx for inspiration and debate, I would be remiss if
I did not weave some insights and commentary by other anthropologists (such as Clastres,
Dumont, Graeber, Lévi-Strauss, and Parry) into my discussion. Like myself, they have all
used theories of exchange to interpret their ethnographic data. To extend my exploration of
the rich and varied views on Mauss, Marx, capitalism, and exchange, I step outside our
discipline and end by considering Lacan’s psychoanalytic perspective on alienation in the
context of capitalism and exchange.
Let us recall that Marx examines the ideological masking of inequality in capitalist exchanges, which had been taken by classical English economists such as Adam Smith and
David Ricardo to be exchanges of equivalent values. Marx achieves his objective through a
critical review of political economy, which Lévi-Strauss (2013:347) considered to be an
“ethnography of capitalism.” In contrast to Marx, Mauss constructs a general, comparative
ethnography of noncapitalist realities. Mauss concludes The Gift by arguing for the
implementation of welfare systems, both private and state, in capitalist societies. For him,
these systems are forms of noncapitalist redistribution as well as repayments for labor. The
latter is considered to be a gift made by the worker from part of his own person, thus
bearing a sacrificial dimension. This gift made of the worker’s self occurs even when labor is
bought and sold. However, the sacrificial aspect of the gift, specifically of labor as a gift, was
never made explicit by Mauss.
For Marx, the exchange that is fundamentally unequal occurs between labor power and
capital. Showing how the exchange of labor power for wages entails the extraction of surplus
value, Marx unveils the “essence” (or perhaps structure) of capitalist unequal exchange. In
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the market, the value produced through labor is transformed into price. For us to
understand what makes it possible to exchange commodities with distinct “use values” in the
market, it is necessary to look beyond what makes them distinct and to focus on what is
equivalent in them. Abstract labor is contained within all commodities, being the substance
they hold in common. On the other hand, concrete labor differentiates the objects to be exchanged. Marx concludes that labor is the “substance of value,” in the sense of being the
font of value, which, in turn, is the foundation of commodities. In short, there is no
extraction, only the conversion of value in the market. We can therefore say that, for Marx,
exchange in the market is a moment of equality (commodities are exchanged for equal
values), while exchange in production is unequal.
Mauss and Marx complement each other in various ways.2 If the latter shows that labor
is a commodity that is bought and sold, Mauss sees it as a gift.3 Unfortunately, Mauss writes
little about labor as a particular type of gift. Even if the question of the sacrificial gift
remains open in his works (Parry 1986:470), I believe I am following his perspective when I
understand the gift as inherently sacrificial and metonymical (Lanna 2007).
Let us turn to Mauss’s definition of the gift. Every gift presents a relationship between
alienability and inalienability, as well as a mixture of facts and ideas. Giving is also receiving
and reciprocating, as the epigraph from The Gift indicates. For Lévi-Strauss (1949), this
“synthetic character” of the gift permits the logical possibility of overcoming the opposition
between self and other. The gift is thus synthetic in more than one sense. It fuses giving,
receiving, and reciprocating, and also binds self and other and unites concept and action. It
was precisely “the intimate union between action and thought,” that had previously
motivated Mauss to study prayer and make it the topic of his doctoral thesis (Fournier
1994:337).
We are far from the liberal notion of barter (in French, troc) or even exchange (échange),
even though the latter term has been adopted in the lexicon of Maussian commentators—
unfortunately, in my opinion. Besides the term “gift,” Mauss also uses “circulation” and,
more rarely, “trade.” The latter is related to the concept of tradition, signifying not
immobility, but its opposite, that which moves. The entity in motion may be either a thing or
person. We can consider Mauss’s work, specifically his demonstration that society is defined
by the circulation of persons and things, as a way of praising tradition.4 On the other hand,
things and people should not alienate themselves too much or too fast, a point with which
Lévi-Strauss agrees, as Marx probably would as well.
For Mauss, circulation is communicative, and communication presupposes the alienability of things and persons. Those aspects of self that are transacted, however, such as clan
affiliation, name or surname, are not necessarily implicated in the psychological dimension of
self.5 Nevertheless, circulation presupposes inalienability, since something of the giver goes
along with what is given, being inexorably connected to the given object (or person). Mauss
(2003:200) writes, “Présenter quelque chose à quelqu’un, c’est présenter quelque chose de soi” (“To give
something to someone is to give something of the self”).6 Alienability refers to that part
which is actually given or transferred to the receiver, while inalienability concerns the part of
the giver that, although passed along and incorporated by the receiver, is not exactly
relinquished, being that which is not given up. Inalienability involves the part of the giver’s
person that goes with the thing or person given and which can encompass or be
encompassed by the receiver.
In Oceania, as Malinowski found in the Trobriands, the inalienable part of the giver,
which goes with the object, is described as something that can “bite” (Mauss 2003:222–23).
As for the alienable aspect, the greater the circulation, the greater is the degree of alienability
in the Maussian sense. In the Marxist sense, we do not have alienability, but alienation,
defined as the labor that is present in the thing being transferred, without any recognition of
the relationship between labor and value in the process of circulation. (This nonrecognition
leads to what Marx calls “commodity fetishism,” which I deal with below). For Marx, greater
circulation would give the appearance of the creation of more value, but for Mauss, the value
of the gift is defined by the degree of the inalienability of what is passed along. Inalienability
refers metonymically to the whole, the more significant part of the gift that does not go (but
which can “bite”), when another, less significant part is alienated.
In this apparent paradox lies Mauss’s notion of value, which arises when the person of
the giver follows the object or person given. This proposition obviously depends on the
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value of the person, that for good reason is the topic of Mauss’s final important text (1938).
Some persons, such as the Brahmans in India, have the capacity to circulate themselves with
religious services. In this exemplary case, their inalienability is greater than others, since the
Brahmanic gift is the supreme gift in many regions of India; there is circulation, giving, and
exchange of services conveyed by and with the Brahman priest. On the other hand, labor in
a general sense is more alienable than religious services, without necessarily generating high
or maximal values. In capitalist cosmologies, it can also be conceived by workers or
capitalists themselves as the only possible way to create value. For instance, one of Brazil’s
largest banks, Bradesco, uses the slogan, só o trabalho produz riquezas (“only labor generates
riches”). Nevertheless, taken as a gift, labor still bears a certain inalienability that includes the
physical aspect, since the body of the worker (in Mauss’s terms, the “producer”) is conveyed
to (and/or destroyed by) someone else. In the conclusion of The Gift, Mauss argues for the
social recognition of a certain inalienability of labor. This suggests a kind of socialist
perspective or even an endorsement of Marx’s theory of alienation: workers do not
recognize themselves in their work (Marx), which, according to the universal ethics of the
gift, they can and should be able to do (Mauss).
As is well known, the Marxist concept of alienation is linked to that of the fetish, described in the first chapter of Book I of Capital. The English word fetish is related to the
Portuguese feitiço (sorcery), the effect that commodities have on human beings. People forget
themselves, failing to recognize themselves as the producers of commodities, which appear
to them as magical entities devoid of labor. Commodities move in a magical dance before
people’s eyes. This is what Marx (1990:163–164) wants to suggest in a passage about a
dancing table and dishes:
A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing. But its analysis
brings out that it is a very strange thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties. So far as it is a use-value, there is nothing
mysterious about it, whether we consider it from the point of view that by
its properties it satisfies human needs, or that it first takes on these
properties are the product of human labour. It is absolutely clear that, by
his activity, man changes the forms of the materials of nature in such a way
as to make them useful to him. The form of wood, for instance, is altered if
a table out of it. Nevertheless the table continues to be wood, an ordinary,
sensuous thing. But as soon as it emerges as a commodity, it changes into a
thing which transcends sensuousness . . . it stands on its head, and evolves
out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were
to begin dancing of its own free will.
This dance, or table-turning, is the alienation of labor. It occurs not simply because
workers spend the whole day in a dark, stinking, factory that is too cold or too hot, earning
less than they ought to, but because they do not manage to see the commodities as the fruit
of their own labor. Commodities dance because they appear to be complete, simply given.
As for Mauss, we have seen that he excludes the notions of barter and trade, which are
so dear to liberal thought; he does the same with a related notion, that of equivalency in
exchange. Circulation is always unbalanced, so much so that I would argue we should speak
not of gifts, but of debts or deferred reciprocity. An example of the gift as debt implying
deferred reciprocity is the relationship between parents and children. Parry (1986) describes
instances in India in which children have the obligation of burying their parents but do not
perceive its fulfillment as implying balanced reciprocity over generations. Such a state of
affairs would produce statements such as “I owe my burial to my son, just as my father owes
his to me.” However, in contrast to such an expression, Indian children believe, “I actually
owe much more to my father than I can repay, just as my son owes me much more than he
can ever repay.” In the end, filial debt is never cancelled. Elsewhere (Lanna 1996), I have
attempted to show that every gift inaugurates a circuit of debt.
Furthermore, following the basic logic of the Maussian gift, tribute is also a gift.7 Like
Polanyi and Malinowski, Mauss considers the yams given to Trobriand chiefs to be “tribute.”8 We can conclude that tribute is a form of the gift and therefore understand the kind of
Polynesian society recognized as a state by Clastres as being formed by tributes (without
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defining the Trobriands as a proto-state). These involve one or multiple centralized circuits
of gifts, something documented in many ethnographies, such as Geertz’s Negara (1980) or
Leach’s Political Systems of Highland Burma (1954). In Leach’s survey of the neighboring
Kachin, Shan, and Chin, all manifested centralizing and hierarchical tendencies that
mimicked one another in certain respects.
In a Maussian vision, not only the state but also the market can been seen as the logical
and historical transformation of the gift itself. Consider the topics of ethnographies of the
gift in contemporary societies, listed on the website of the Mouvement Anti-Utilitariste dans les
Sciences Sociales (M.A.U.S.S.) inspired by Allan Caillé (www.revuedumauss.com.fr). These
include trust (1994), sacrifice (1995), religion (2003), prison, abandonment, and pardons
(2012), and health and treatment (2013), among others. While these are important
ethnographies, they adhere to the orthodox view that gifts and commodities are in parallel
circuits, rather than focusing on relationships between gifts and commodities, whether these
relationships are hierarchical or transformations (or even transformations among relations of
production, as Graeber [2007] suggests). Despite the efforts of M.A.U.S.S., we still need to
understand that circuits of commodities are constituted by and modeled after circuits of
gifts, if not themselves constituting circuits of gifts. The members of M.A.U.S.S. seem closer
to Mauss when the latter “emphasized that the phenomenon of trade and ‘markets’… were
universal phenomena and existed side by side with gift prestation,” but “nevertheless
stressed the differences between the two forms of exchange” (Turner 1968:124). My
argument here, which I also consider to be Maussian with a Dumontian twist, is that those
differences also imply historical continuities and structural transformation, so much so that
the gift can encompass the commodity form.
The commodity form can also appear in the form of the gift (such as the presents
bought for Christmas, Father’s, or Mother’s Day) and vice versa (such as the selling of
bodies for labor). And like a gift, a commodity can take on a material or immaterial form. As
Mauss said of gifts, commodities can be objects or reputations, titles, names, images, songs,
visits, services, dances, etc. In all the cases considered in The Gift, from the Northwest Coast
in North America to ancient Rome, not only does that which circulates bear traces of the
persons who possessed them, but also “the person is possessed by the thing.” If there is a
person in things, and if the giver goes with them, the question of which is the subject and
which is the object of the gift in each case is obscured. The radical distinction between
persons and things drawn by modern humanism becomes specified. The contrast with Marx
reemerges: Mauss considers persons in things and things as persons in all societies (rather
than, as Gregory [1982] suggests, things as persons in gift economies and persons as things
in market economies), while Marx considers how things become mystified and persons
become things in capitalism (Lukács 1974). We can conclude that Marx implicitly assumes a
mode of separation between persons and things to be universal or desirable. Mauss,
however, argues that this mode is specifically modern, a form that is “ours,” as he puts it in
the conclusion of The Gift. By contrast, as Dumont (1977) shows, Marx universalizes a
particular conception of liberty and autonomy of the person.
Mauss, in turn, famously demonstrates that behind each gift are “mechanisms of obligatory repayment,” which the Maori call “hau” and Lévi-Strauss (1949) calls the “principle
of reciprocity.” This major insight by Mauss in The Gift is, however, often poorly understood. Mauss was already fascinated by the history of each object (as were the Trobrianders, as Malinowski demonstrated so well in his study Argonauts of the Western Pacific and as
was confirmed by Munn [1986] who revisited the theme). Emphasizing this diachronic
dimension, Appadurai (1986) and Venkatesan (2011), among others, abandon Lévi-Strauss’s
synthetic nature of the gift. But the circulation of objects through time does not mean that
we must abandon the notion of the gift as involving reciprocity between person-objects.
Besides, Mauss also has a theory of history, aspiring to construct a “total narrative.” In this
respect, Mauss again reveals similar influences of nineteenth-century evolutionism on his
thinking to those of Marx. Parry (1986:458–459) touches on this point, even comparing
Mauss to Maine. Mauss seeks to discover the Indo-European origins of the modern French
era and organizes The Gift by splitting human history into three main stages of gift
circulation. The relatively egalitarian “total prestations” of Melanesia and Australia comprise
the first. The agonistic ones typical of aristocratic societies appear later, and precede those of
the modern stage. In the case of Marx’s analyses, we should not confuse his dialectical
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model, which assumes syntheses, with evolutionism (although Engels’s simplification of
Marx’s model in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State has been often and
correctly criticized).
More important for our purposes here is the fact that, for Mauss, behind particular
historical forms lie universal social logics, such as the “mechanisms of repayment.” He does
not make any conjectures about them to justify a supposed moral superiority of the
industrialized West. However, in his 1938 essay on the person, he suggests that a development or expansion of the category or notion of the individual person has taken place, and his
essay describes a linear, historical evolution of that notion. In this respect, Lévi-Strauss’s
(1950) famous criticism of how Mauss generalized the Maori notion of hau in The Gift makes
sense with respect to Mauss’s evolutionism. It is not that Lévi-Strauss censors Mauss’s
immersion in ethnographic data (an accusation often leveled against the former in contrast
to the latter). Rather, Lévi-Strauss criticizes Mauss for taking the category of hau as an
evolutionary survival, as if it were a passepartout key that could open any door. Lévi-Strauss’s
criticism does not refer to what we today call Mauss’s “ethnographic theory,” but rather to
any attempt to produce a general theory of history based on a particular native notion. This
was also one of Durkheim’s errors in generalizing from notions such as the “sacred” or
“totems,” an approach replicated by Mauss in the first phase of his intellectual activity.
Furthermore, the category of the “person” is similar to the “general mechanisms of
obligatory repayment” that Mauss sees behind the notion of hau. Using the principle of
reciprocity in place of the native category of hau, Lévi-Strauss (1950) seeks a symbolic theory
of the social as a replacement for Durkheim’s social theory of symbols.
In contrast to Parry (1986:465), who claims that Mauss saw a nonexistent dichotomy
between person and thing in the notion of hau, I hold that Mauss makes it possible to
criticize this dichotomy, which for him characterizes not Maori, but rather, modern thought.
He thus flirts with a new, broader humanism, which Lévi-Strauss would later develop
(Maniglier 2000). The Gift also contains a critique of Christian ideology, implicitly viewed as
an apology for charity and as a logical absurdity, since nowhere do there exist what
Malinowski calls “free gifts.” In the latter’s typology, which rearranges Trobriand exchanges
from the most egalitarian to the most hierarchical, “free gifts” refer mainly to the exchanges
between Trobriand husbands and wives and between parents and children (Malinowski
1953:177, 191). But Mauss argues that there are no nonreciprocal, disinterested relationships.
Even Malinowski (1953:178) recognized, as early as 1922 in Argonauts of the Western Pacific that
“there is no comprehensive name for this class of free gifts in native terminology” Four
years later, he admitted that Mauss was correct to question the description of free gifts
(Malinowski 1926:40–41). The free gift is an impossibility, Mauss demonstrated, because
reciprocity lies behind every gift. On the other hand, many anthropologists (predominantly
those trained in Great Britain or who, like Malinowski, were active there) argue in favor of
the free gift, as if there had been some sort of original equality, a view perhaps based on a
deep-rooted sense of unconscious religiosity.
Parry (1986:458) demonstrates that “the ideology of a disinterested gift emerges in
parallel with an ideology of a purely interested exchange.” For Laidlaw (2008), the supposed
free gift is important precisely for not giving rise to social ties and thus allowing the
existence of the renouncer who receives it; the same argument could be made of the Hindu
priest or Brahman who gives it. Venkatesan (2011) suggests that the “free gift magnifies
people’s sense of themselves, their relations with one another and to ‘gigantic’ entities that
confront human life yet exceed it.” He also proposes the practical reasoning that, in the region of southern India that he studied, the mythical “free gift” of mats for the English queen
increased the circulation of these mats as commodities.
Laidlaw (2008:617) takes up Parry’s idea that the free gift is not a specifically Christian
idea. In his view all the great religions have their modes of institutionalizing it, such as the
alms of the Śvētāmbara, one of the great Jainist sects in India that he analyzed. Venkatesan
(2011), in turn, asks why the idea of the free gift has endured? It strikes me as necessary to
further specify: why should it endure as an ideological formula of the “great religions” (and, I
might add, of certain anthropologists)? What kind of gift is this “free” gift? Is it truly a gift or
just a rhetorical formula? It should not be necessary to point out that Christian practice
presents its own form of reciprocity, differing from Christian rhetoric, according to which true
charity excludes the establishment of relationships between inferiors and superiors, as well as
214

Tipití: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America

the desire for superiority and selfishness. In this way Christian rhetoric asserts exactly the
opposite of what Mauss argues to be the case for all forms of the gift, which, in his view,
operates as a mediator between selfishness and altruism and superiority and inferiority, as
well as between other oppositions. But if we associate this rhetoric of free gifts as a formula
that enables the establishment of hierarchical differences in form while explicitly negating
them in ideology, then we have the gift in the classic Maussian sense.
Let us return to the contrasts between Mauss and Marx. We have seen how the latter
considers the capitalist form of alienation and the former discusses forms of noncapitalist
inalienability. We have also seen that Marx’s criticism of alienation and the fetishism of
commodities takes him beyond the distinction between persons and things implicit in
modern humanism. He envisions a society in which persons attain a potential he imagines to
be possible, becoming truly human, perhaps for the first time. He imagines an unalienated
human condition, beyond things, in which persons are the only legitimate subjects of exchange.
From this perspective, the idea of a circulation of persons, or of persons as objects of
exchange, is scandalous. This is understandable in the case of chattel slavery and other forms
of submission, but, for Mauss, the person-thing amalgam is related to a universal condition
that we have to research, even if it assumes different forms. Marx’s critique of alienation
constructs a notion of humanity as distinct from things and, furthermore, as being in control of
things. Indeed, he imagines that, as a consequence of social evolution, people will eventually
be in control of a nonobjectified, almost Platonic, world. Marx characterizes his critique of
alienation as scientific, in contrast to the nineteenth-century socialist theories that he
considers idealistic dreams. But it is not only Marx, but modernity as well, that rebels against
the notion of person-things or thing-ified persons, which are produced by modernity itself.
It is as if persons could be liberated from this condition. For Mauss, the thing-ification of
persons is not, however, merely an artifact of modernity, but a condition that humans always
live. Marx beautifully complements Mauss by showing us that this condition implies
particular mystifications. Mauss seeks to go beyond a narrow liberal definition of the person
based on desires and psychological motivations. Along these lines, Dumont (1977) discusses
similarities between Marx and modern liberal thinkers. Although Dumont is critical of Marx,
he also accepts the description of modernity as generating the thing-ifying of persons, as
Marx had asserted and as Gregory (1982) has also argued more recently.
As Dumont (1977) and Gregory (1982) note when exploring the complementarity
between the two, Mauss analyzes the society of persons (and things that have become
persons), while Marx analyzes the society of things (and persons who have become things).
But for Mauss, as we have seen, it is not only in capitalism that persons are conceived as
things. The Gift shows that persons and things are mutually implicated in each other
everywhere, perhaps somewhat less in “our societies.” It demonstrates further that, even if
these interconnections and imbrications are universal, they nevertheless take on particular
forms and are not due to some confusion or lack of comprehension or incapacity of
nonmodern minds. Mauss does not criticize how persons are possessed by things, but, to the
contrary, accepts this as a given social condition. Marx, however, holds an ideal of the
acquisitive person with complete power over things, a view not much different from liberal
thinkers, as Dumont (1977) argued. Of course, this is open to debate, since one could
develop the Marxist idea of humans transforming themselves by means of engagement with
nature.9
But, in his day, Mauss criticizes another type of fetishism, the “fetishism of politics” and
of the functions of the state, which he encountered in both Bolshevism and social
democracy. Mauss thus criticizes the utilitarianism of liberal thinkers as well as the Bolsheviks’ idea that the ends justify the means and the latter’s opposition to democratic laws
and institutions. Elsewhere, Mauss condemned the Bolsheviks and those who made “pilgrimages” to Moscow (Fournier 1994:417) whom in a letter to A. Varagnac he charged with
bringing back “disorder” to France (Fournier 1994:393). After he stopped writing for
L’Humanité, which he associated with Bolshevism, and began writing for La Vie Socialiste
(Fournier 1994:416), he planned to write a book on socialism that contrasted it with
Bolshevism. He berated Russian communists for “the poverty of their ideas and their legal
and administrative accomplishments.” He criticized the establishment of “laws and rights
through coups of decrees and violence,” and the belief “that interests can be created without
the consent and trust of those interested.” He went further to condemn Bolshevik policies
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for having “totally destroyed” the economy through the “abolition of private commerce,
suppression of all markets, all stock exchanges, all speculation” and for “having dried up the
very fountain of social life, trust and good faith.” And, in Mauss’s withering judgment,
Bolshevik actions stood “not only outside moral law but also of the most elementary laws of
political wisdom” (Fournier 1994:427). However, Mauss never made any association
between Bolshevism (or “the dictatorship of the Communist Party over the proletariat”
[Fournier 1994:427.]) and the theories of Marx.
Although Mauss said in 1920 that he was not charmed “by the theoretical value of
Lenin’s writings and even less by the value of those of Trotsky” (cited in Fournier 1994:421),
he was interested in Lenin’s NEP (New Economic Policy), which had been adopted just at
the time Mauss was writing The Gift (Graeber 2001:157). The NEP allowed some commerce
in the communist U.S.S.R., along with some foreign investment, and abandoned some of the
strategies of collectivism. The return of some form of the market to the U.S.S.R. led Mauss
to evaluate the logical and historical significance of this institution, since experience was
proving it was impossible to abolish the buying and selling of commodities. This was
probably also due to the fact that he saw the “spirit of the gift” as present in commodities,
making it difficult or impossible to supersede the market.
Nevertheless, as Graeber (2000:157) notes, Mauss felt that the market violated people’s
sense of justice. The Gift tries to understand the appeal of social security programs and
socialist parties and what ethnography from around the world could reveal about universal
standards of justice that would also be capable of encompassing the market. In various
societies analyzed in The Gift, such as India and ancient Rome, Mauss finds the market to be
present, although not as a basic or preeminent social principle. Mauss’s position is similar to
Polanyi’s (2000). The latter held that modern capitalist societies are distinctive because their
market constitutes an autonomous sphere, even though there has never been a “market
society.” Mauss and Polanyi both position themselves as noncommunist socialists, but,
unfortunately, these two great readers of Malinowski never read each other.
Mauss also criticized modern revolutionaries for seeking to abolish private property
(Mauss 1920:264). At the same time, he did not romanticize gift societies as ideal or as a
more perfect model for managing persons and things. He was aware of the fundamental role
of the gift in aristocratic societies; indeed, societies such as the Maori in Polynesia, the
Kwakiutl of the Northwest Coast, and the Vedics of India are the focus of The Gift. It is not
only or even principally in egalitarian settings that the gift is relevant.
Many anthropologists have understood the Northwest Coast potlatch as a mechanism of
redistribution that contrast with capitalism since peoples from the region valued giving and
even the destruction of wealth, rather than its accumulation. Since Boas wrote in the early
twentieth century, many excellent and detailed ethnographies of these peoples have been
written. Nevertheless, nonspecialists continue to make hasty generalizations about the
potlatch, offering vague assertions about Kwakiutl life, such as “everything was a pretext for
extensive, repeated celebrations” (Godbout and Caillé 2000:104). Benedict (1934) in Patterns
of Culture seems to come close to this position when she “castigated the Kwakiutl for their
obsession with riches, desire for superiority, and what she saw as their shameless, paranoid
megalomania” (Godbout and Caillé 2000:105).
Imprecise interpretations fail to recognize that any gift that is given must also be received. Kwakiutl chiefs were not only redistributors but also receivers of tribute gifts.
Anthropologist of indigenous America have not yet addressed this adequately, having instead
privileged chiefly giving. Mauss points out the capacity of chiefs—whether Amerindian,
Melanesian, or any other, despite their enormous differences and the specificity of each
case—to centralize acts of reciprocity. Malinowski also described Trobriand chiefs as
exercising such centralization. Lévi-Strauss’s analyses of the Bororo and Nambiquara chiefs
follow Mauss’s perspective as well. Thus, the gift does not preclude the establishment of
hierarchies: to the contrary, it promotes them.
As I noted earlier, Christian rhetoric goes to exceptional lengths to imagine disinterested
gifts in the form of charity. Mauss provides further evidence of material prestations
(portions of the harvest, animals, land, money, etc.) from lower segments of various societies
being conceived as tribute for which religious services were received in return, such as those
from Brahmans. When and how is it appropriate to give an “immaterial” prestation in
exchange for one that is “material”?
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It is difficult to read Mauss’s reflections on Brahmans without recalling Christian priests.
Christian ideology denies the rule of reciprocity as a universal, imagining a pure gift, charity,
“offering the other cheek,” and so on. Christianity leads to the same paradox as relativism
(Aron 1970; Valeri 1992). The party that rhetorically negates any superiority actually assumes
a superior position. It is only in an ideological and rhetorical form that the free gift or pure
gift exists. Ethnographic descriptions of the prestations surrounding any Christian priest
should analyze the ideological construction of an “exchange” as the circulation of religious
services (words, prayers, rituals, etc.) moving in one direction, and material values moving in
the opposite one. For instance, in São Bento do Norte in the Brazilian state of Rio Grande
do Norte, where I conducted research, various types of food (but never money) were given
by the community to the local priest in exchange for his services (Lanna 1995). Rather than
using the concept of exchange to refer to any kind of circulation, I prefer to apply it to the
ideological construction of the encounter of two circuits of prestations, or debts, moving in
opposite directions. This applies to the “exchange” of religious services for material
prestations. It is precisely for this reason that a theory of ideology, or superstructures, is
necessary.
I believe that the Christian idea of exchange reappears in the works of important anthropologists such as Pierre Clastres (Lanna 2005, 2013). By imagining what he calls
“nonexchange” between the chief (or the “region of power,” as he puts it) and an Amerindian “society” through a process in which women go to the chief while goods and words
come from him, Clastres gives new life to the idea of the pure or free gift, even though he
does not use the term. Instead, he uses the term “nonexchange” to refer to three unilateral
movements: those of women, words, and goods. But words are somehow also spoken to the
chief, just as gifts are also given to him; similarly, he is not only a wife-receiver, but a wifegiver as well, since his sisters and daughters also marry. I would argue that we should better
understand prestations in terms of a unilateral gift circuit that is compensated by another
debt circuit moving against it in the other direction.
I indicated earlier that members of M.A.U.S.S. have written important ethnographies
about gift circuits in capitalist societies, analyzing, among other themes, basic ideas upon
which such societies are established, such as the notion of trust. By contrast, Mauss himself
did not seem to be interested in this type of ethnography of the modern gift. For example,
he did not consider Christmas holidays or bourgeois expenses and conspicuous
consumption as points of possible comparison with noncapitalist realities. The reason for
this, I believe, was that his interests were focused on commodities as transformations of gift
forms. As a contemporary example of the gift, social security emerges as a fundamental
theme in the conclusion of The Gift, precisely because it relates to market exchanges. The
market is a pillar of capitalist society, as Marx and Polanyi viewed it, but it is also a logical
and historical transformation of gift forms. The same can be said of the formation of the
state. As I noted, Mauss, Polanyi, and Malinowski understood Trobriand gifts to the chief as
tribute, suggesting some continuity between chiefdoms and the state. If tribute is one
possible gift form, so, too, is violence. Thus considerations of the gift uphold the
conventional view of the origin of the state as arising from religious centralization and
tribute, and the perspective that state ideology takes form as a relationship of reciprocity
between rulers and the ruled. However, since Lévi-Strauss, this reciprocity should be
understood as structural, not just ideological. If M.A.U.S.S. demonstrates the presence of the
gift in capitalism, it is important to consider the market and the state as not being alien to the
gift. For M.A.U.S.S., but not for Mauss, there is a certain type of distance between the gift,
on the one hand, and, on the other, the market and state, despite the parallels between them.
It is interesting to compare the efforts of M.A.U.S.S. with those of British anthropologists (especially contributors to Bloch and Parry’s [1989] volume, Money and the Morality of
Exchange), who moved in the inverse direction. While the French sociologists revealed the
gift operating in capitalist reality, the British anthropologists wrote ethnographies about the
introduction of money in societies that previously had been analyzed without paying
attention to it. Both groups explored the overlaps between gifts and commodities, but
neither of them recognized the hierarchy between them in the terms I am proposing here.
Returning to the contrast between Mauss and Marx, the latter asks why capitalism is not
condemned more widely. We have seen that his answer lies in the notion of ideology. Mauss
asks precisely the opposite question: from the perspective of workers (or, as he called them,
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“producers”), why would there be a condemnation of the capitalist, mercantile ethic? He
finds the answer in the existence of a general ethic, based not on profit, but on the gift. The
conclusion of The Gift suggests that producers would like to follow the things they have
produced. By way of contrast with Marx, the issue is not that workers should become
conscious of the mystification of capitalist production, but, to the contrary, that we in
modern times ought to be conscious that labor, besides being a commodity, is a gift. In what
Mauss calls “our societies,” the gift of labor is given both to the individual employer and to
society as a whole. In my opinion, the gift aspect of labor complements Marx’s point that
labor power is bought and sold.
For Marx, political economic exploitation in capitalism is effectively hidden through
ideological means. It can only be overcome through new forms of consciousness, which are
a precondition for social revolution that enables the producers to control the means of
production, as well as through science. In The German Ideology, Marx (1984, orig. 1845–1846)
presents the concept of ideology and his theory of the materialist dialectic, transforming the
Hegelian dialectic into a materialist one. For Marx, that which is not a dialectic, that is, which
does not expose the contradictions of things is ideological. Bourgeois political economy, for
instance, is ideological because it explains capitalism without exposing its contradictory
character. A new form of science is necessary, one that shows things as they are “in fact.” It is
necessary to go beyond the description of their appearance to reveal their contradictory
nature. The dialectic, for Marx, is a method that reveals the essence of capital.
This takes us to John Steinbeck´s (1960) famous phrase about “the so-called Communists” he met: “I guess the trouble was that we didn´t have any self-admitted proletarians.
Everyone was a temporally embarrassed capitalist.” In accordance or not to Steinbeck´s
intention, it has received the understanding that not only Communists, but poor people and
middle class people in America, rather than consider themselves to be exploited, feel
themselves to be the equals of rich people, or as “temporarily embarrassed millionaires.”
This interpretation is found outside the United States and can be considered a Marxist understanding of American people. It could explain why capitalists like Donald Trump have
political appeal, something that happens in other countries as well. But Mauss would differ:
in the conclusion of The Gift, he asserts that capitalist exploitation is immediately perceived
by producers through their sense of justice and that it could be overcome through the return
of “customs of noblesse oblige” in new forms of the gift (Mauss 2003:298). Because he takes
a universal anticapitalist sense of justice for granted, Mauss does not consider his call for
new institutionalized forms of the gift to be naïve. He further proposes the substitution of
some forms of commodities with gifts (such as state redistribution) and the substitution of
some forms of gifts with commodities (endorsing the demand by unions and artists that
their labor and art be valued more highly).
A certain contradiction exists between Marx and Mauss, since, for the latter, producers
want to follow the things they produce, while, for the former, workers are not conscious of
their person or their labor being in things (and, in Steinbeck’s opinion concerning the
situation in the United States, they do not have class consciousness). Mauss seems more
naïve by viewing the capital-labor contract in terms of gift relations. For both Marx and
Mauss, producers or workers deserve more than their wages, but the latter relies on the logic
of reciprocity to ground his argument that producers deserve security against unemployment, illness, old age, and death. Social welfare is necessary because it derives from the
principle that producers give their lives to both their employer and the collectivity (Mauss
2003:296). They thus give something even more valuable than their labor by sacrificing part
of their persons. According to Mauss, the employer has a moral debt, which ought to mean
collaborating in building up the worker’s savings. The same holds for the state, since
producers have given something not only to their employers, but also to society at large.
Social security is thus a responsibility, a repayment to producers. It thus constitutes “state
socialism” (Mauss 2003:296).
For Marx, in turn, wages are a form of unequal exchange that appears to be fair only as
long as workers are not able to adopt a global perspective. In this respect, capitalism is
ideologically effective. For Mauss, however, producers tend not to accept wages as fair,
because they compare it with the universal moral logic of the gift. Marx considers wage
contracts to be derived from bourgeois logic, while Mauss looks to various forms of
contracts beyond bourgeois society for a more general meaning of contracts.
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We know that workers give of themselves in exchange for wages. I would highlight, as
does Marx, the illusory aspect of this “exchange,” but my reason for doing so draws on
Mauss’s teachings. The wage-for-labor exchange is not a matter of a single transaction, but
rather of circuits involving labor moving in one direction and, in the other, circuits of
money-taking-the-form-of-wages. When these two cross, there is the illusion of an exchange.
As with the Melanesian kula ring, there is not merely an exchange of necklaces for bracelets,
but circuits of bracelets that are counterbalanced by circuits of necklaces. Each circuit is
structured by a deferred reciprocity that Lévi-Strauss called “generalized exchange” (like that
involved in matrilateral marriages of men with their mother’s brother’s daughter). This is
precisely the type of reciprocity that Parry failed to note in the Indian case when, for
example, he mentions the circulation of water cups among castes, involving prescriptions on
the direction of movement in the circuits (Parry 1986:461–462). However, this type of giving
does not manifest the “negation of the obligation of a return”; rather, the gift is for someone
else, a third party. Parry is right to claim that there is no quid pro quo. But he is not describing
a dyadic relationship (or what Lévi-Strauss [1949] termed “restricted exchange”).
While some may consider the conclusions Mauss presents to be naïve, Graeber, by
contrast, attempts to show their enduring relevance. He points out that “it is commonplace
to dismiss Mauss’ political conclusions at the end of The Gift as weak, inconsistent, not of the
same power or brilliance of the rest of the essay” (Graeber 2001:163). He recognizes that it
is “idiosyncratic” to think of the “rich” as becoming “aristocratic treasurers,” and that such
an assertion could be criticized as a “stumblingly inadequate attempt to imitate Marx”
(Graeber 2001:163). But he praises “Mauss’s approach to alienation as providing a useful
corrective to some of the most common blind spots of Marxian anthropology” (Graeber
2001:163).
I would argue that the idea of “the rich capitalists as treasurers” does imply a naïve
criticism or even a lack of knowledge regarding the concept of ideology and alienation as
false consciousness, as developed in The German Ideology. On the other hand, the inalienability
universally present in the gift to a greater or lesser extent coexists with alienation in the
Marxist sense. Alienation in this sense involves fetishism, taking a thing as being more than a
thing, as something that has life. Mauss takes us further by arguing that it is precisely in this
way that, according to native thinking, a thing may represent its giver since part of the giver is
in the thing and can follow it. This occurs not only in capitalism but also in any context
when objects move from one person to another. As Graeber (2001:163) points out,
More daringly, Mauss appears to be suggesting that a certain degree of
subject/object reversal—in certain contexts, at certain levels—might act
not as mystification or an instrument of exploitation, but as a normal aspect
of creative processes that may not be nearly so dangerous as its opposite,
the reduction of all social relations to any sort of objective calculus.
This “reversal” is precisely what Lévi-Strauss (1950) shows is implicit in Mauss. My
conclusion is that ethnography shows that mystification and exploitation are “normal
aspects” of social life. The conclusion of The Gift implies that some degree of mystification
and subject/object reversal lies in the very constitution of any communicative processes.
Graeber accepts this as part of “creative processes,” but I argue that this reversal is the
essence of any social process defined as communication. While Graeber states that the
subject/object reversal “might act not as mystification or an instrument of exploitation,” I
believe it acts simultaneously as part of the processes of mystification and exploitation in the
gift as commodity and the commodity as gift.
According to Mauss, there is something transcendental in the gift, a “communication of
souls,” as he expressed it. At the same time, there is something mystifying in the gift,
although not in the same way as Marx’s concept of alienation would have it. As we saw,
“Mauss’s work complements Marx,” but not only, or even mainly, “because it represents the
other side of socialism” as Graeber (2001:163) proposes. Nor is it because “as Mauss himself
observed, he [Marx] carefully avoided speculating about what a more just society would be
like…[while] Mauss’s instincts were quite the opposite: he was much less interested in
understanding the dynamics of capitalism than in trying to understand—and create—
something that might stand outside it” (Graeber 2001:163). The major difference between
219

Illusion and Value

Mauss and Marx, I believe, is that the former sees mystification as inherent in the social
rather than as harmful.
Here we return to Lévi-Strauss, for whom, if communication has to follow rules in order
to signify, what it signifies are illusions of perception. These do not come from “excessive
sensory or mental activity,” as traditional psychology would have it, but are an “ elementary
manifestation of an intrinsic power where all activities of the mind originate.” (Lévi-Strauss
1985:174). Here, Lévi-Strauss’s theory of superstructures meets up with Marx’s theory of
infrastructure. Superstructures are not exactly “false consciousness,” in Marx’s terms, but
“slips” (not in the sense of Freudian-Lacanian parapraxis) that are “socially successful.”10
Marx, Freud, Mauss, Lévi-Strauss, each had his theory of illusions. Marx understood better
than Mauss how profound the structuring of alienation in capitalism is. On the other hand,
Marx sought to overcome it, whereas Mauss did not think this was possible.
Given the growing anthropological interest in the relations between persons and things,
persons as things, and things as persons, the Maussian perspective is fruitful in the context
of a general, comparative ethnography of human thought and practices. It is also less likely
to lead to a reduction of social relations to “some type of objective calculus,” to recall
Graeber’s (2001:163) expression, that both Marx and Mauss showed was characteristic of
liberal thinking. However, as Dumont (1977) argues, Marx himself fell victim to some of the
same liberal assumptions. Along lines similar to Dumont’s critique of Marx, Mauss criticized
Bolshevik thinking in the 1920s, characterizing the Soviet regime as a particular combination
of a centralizing redistribution and market logic. Like Mauss, Polanyi (2000) and Dumont
(1983) sought to construct theoretical alternatives to Marxism, as well as to liberal thought.
Mauss drew on ethnographic information from noncapitalist societies, a subject that had
also been of interest to Marx. The task of collecting and analyzing ethnographic data is, of
course, the foundation of contemporary anthropology. We should not overlook the fact that,
in The German Ideology and elsewhere, Marx argued that we must cast our gaze on
noncapitalist dynamics in order to understand the market, the state, and wages.11 By thinking
of capitalism in relation to noncapitalist reality, and vice versa, we can better understand the
logical and historical transformations of the gift. It is often forgotten that Marx and Morgan
considered the regimes of bourgeois property in relation to the Iroquois. Similarly, Parry
(1986:459) drew on ancient history to shed light on the contemporary notion of “the legal
separation of persons from things” that he traced back to an “ideological
revolution…located in the late Roman Empire [that is] central to our concepts of property
and market exchange.”
For Graeber (2001:158), Mauss’s socialism is closer to that of Proudhon or the anarchists, for whom capitalist ideas and institutions were a source of moral critique for capitalism itself. Graeber sees in Marx the ambition and ability to understand totalities (citing the
difference between concrete and abstract labor, the relationship between the costs of
reproduction and global surpluses as an indication of exploitation, and so on). He notes that,
by contrast, “Mauss does not even talk about production in preindustrial societies, he has no
sense of the reproduction of social systems as wholes, he lacks a theory of value” (Graeber
2001:163). It is widely accepted that Mauss based his theories on the local, never straying far
from the native point of view, and this represents a limitation of this thought, as Lévi-Strauss
(1950) has noted. But I would contend, in contrast to Graeber (2001:162), that Mauss does
have a theory of value as well as of alienation. In fact, his theory of inalienability is an
inherent part of his theory of value. I would also argue that there is an exteriority in Mauss’s
perspective, even if it is different from Marx’s. After all, Mauss is a precursor of comparison
through the “view from afar.” He did not define ideas and institutions simply in terms of
their functions, but through their principles and how they structure ways of being.
Marx, on the other hand, sees the proletariat as a truly revolutionary class precisely
because it is dialectally contradicted in and by capitalism, a fundamental point recalled by
Graeber (2001). Marx takes a perspective that implies that only “from below” could one see
the totality. Only the proletarian class could liberate itself, dialectically opposing itself to the
totality of the “system” and creating something radically new that could not be imagined or
described on the basis of current reality.12 In this regard, I believe, Marx, even more than
Mauss, clings to a native perspective that arises from within the structure of capitalist
production. He may have done so because, among other reasons, he did not have access to
the volume of ethnographic and historical facts of noncapitalist realities that Mauss did later
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on. If Graeber is right that Mauss did not think of capitalism as a totality, we can
nevertheless assert that Mauss revealed the “mechanisms of the gift,” which we could call, in
an institutional sense, the “elementary form” of all social life. Just as Lévi-Strauss later
deconstructed totemism as an institutional form, but retained it as a fundamental logical,
metaphorical operation, Mauss abstracted the principle of reciprocity from the institutional
form of gifts.13 The presence of this “elementary form” in capitalism has been emphasized in
the last few decades by some sociologists and ethnographers, such as those linked to
M.A.U.S.S. But this also lends a new perspective regarding Marx’s contribution to the
understanding of commodities and the process of capital accumulation. We now see these as
elementary institutional forms of life under capitalism.

Postscript
As a postscript to this comparison between Marx and Mauss, let me briefly consider Jacques
Lacan’s concept of alienation, which, like them, he situated in a framework of capitalism and
exchange. For Lacan, a certain false consciousness resides in any signified; paradoxically,
however, he sees significance and certain truths as arising from signifying chains, such as
displacements, omissions, slips, lapses, forgetting, and resistance. According to Lacan (1997),
desires are only revealed through dislocations, ruptures, and fissures in consciousness, and,
being pure “desiring,” are defined by the impossibility of satisfaction (Antonio 2015:156). He
argues that the needs of particular individual subjects are replete with truths that are unique
and related to his or her history and “island” (Lacan 2008), similar to what Lévi-Strauss
(1958:219–20, 253) calls the “individual myth.”
For Lacan, the “I” is constituted in relation to the Other, who confers imaginary, alienated identity on the “I,” and who by means of this conferral contributes to the development of the psyche. The Other is of a symbolic, cultural order. The structure of language
constitutes the subject from a set of demands, desires, and designs directed toward him or
her since birth, and even before. From a position of helplessness and dependence, the
subject develops at the mercy of the Other’s desires, a process that Lacan calls “alienation.”
The Lacanian person is alienated through language (Antonio 2015), but Lacan uses the notions of language, symbolic order, and structure in a weak sense, much differently than does
Lévi-Strauss. The Lacanian clinic is a venue for critiquing the alienation of the “I” that
occurred through the ideas of satisfaction offered by the capitalist system. To assist the
subject to resist giving in to desire, therapy paradoxically consists of defending his or her
desiring condition. Therapy proposes to go beyond consciousness, to de-alienate the subject
from the determinations of language—something that Lévi-Strauss would not consider
possible. We should also acknowledge the monetary prestations that the subject in analysis
makes to the therapist. Independently of its specific form, these prestations are structurally
similar to those given to priests, whether Brahmans or Christians, which we discussed earlier.
For Lacan, alienation is thus the “desiring condition,” the Other’s construction of the
self’s desire. Alienation is structural, although not in a Lévi-Straussian sense of structure,
because the subject is alienated through language. After years of analysis, if it is successful,
the subject should be able to maintain relationships without worrying about serving the
desires of, or being desired by, the Other. This is achieved in part when the “symptom” is
revealed. At this point, the subject in analysis stops being worried about satisfying the Other,
filling in the lack of the Other, or serving as the speech of the Other, since he or she has
learned that such satisfaction is impossible and begins to seek his or her own desires
(Antonio 2015). As does Marxism, Lacan suggests a “liberating consciousness of alienation,”
a new reality constructed scientifically but as yet only presupposed. Lacanian psychoanalysis
rests on an unsurmountable contradiction, since therapy seeks a “liberating consciousness of
alienation,” even though the apprehension of something by consciousness is no more than a
fiction. Our inescapable destiny is to desire without ever being sated, and to seek happiness
without ever reaching it (Antonio 2015:157).
The desiring condition of the subject is related to consumerism, from which he or she
must detach, even though it is impossible for any subject to be truly liberated from capitalist
alienation. For Lacan, capitalism is a “superstructure” in the Marxist (not Lévi-Straussian)
sense: it is ideological and related to false consciousness. Capitalism in this sense promotes
the illusion of satisfaction through consumption, leading subjects to believe that completeness
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is possible if they buy, for instance, a slew of Ferraris. Capitalist alienation thus occurs
through goading. The therapist’s aim is to help subjects realize that the satisfaction proposed
by capitalist reality will never be achieved. If subjects in analysis want to buy Ferraris, the
Lacanian analyst must help them deconstruct this desire, which is a “symptom.” This is
accomplished by linking the “truth” of the desire to primeval moments expressed in each
subject’s individual myth. Subjects will always be unhappy, always lack something, but they
must also always pay the therapist’s bill. Lacan criticizes the medicalization of neurosis in the
same way as he criticizes capitalist reality, since both alienate the subject by taking away any
capacity for autonomy.14 Nonetheless, Lacanian psychoanalysis proposes an even more radical
form of alienation: the alienation of the subject from him- or herself. The impossibility of
subversion is considered to be liberating by both the subject and the therapist (Antonio
2015:269).
At this point, however, we need to ask, does Lacanianism fall into the trap of what
Freud called the “narcissism of small differences”? After all, Lacan’s liberation occurs not
between individuals but within each, exemplifying the movement from large to small intervals, and from small intervals to even more minute ones. This is reminiscent of the LéviStrauss’s theory of history (from myth to legend to romance, for instance). As Antonio
(2015:123) remarks,
Freud conceived of narcissism as love of oneself, while Lacan, as alienation of
an imaginary I; Freud spoke of the satisfaction of desires, Lacan, of how desire
cannot be satisfied, the lack being structural to the subject; Freud spoke of the
object of drives, while Lacan dealt only with the lost object. Furthermore, the
latter constructed concepts such as master signifier, objet petit a, foreclosure, lack
of being, imaginary-symbolic-real, and sinthome, among others, based more on
authors such as Plato, Hegel, Kojève, Politzer, Saussure, Lévi-Strauss, and
Jakobson. [my translation]
Given that Lacanian psychoanalysts aim to promote “an interior asceticism, a liberation, and
a subversion of the subject” (Antonio 2015:156), I conclude that Lacanian alienation is
narcissistic and individualistic in the Dumontian sense of the individual seeking liberation.
In reality, we see that “people are running toward a future and behind the losses of a
past. But to be in movement all the time is alienating. In order to have power back in your
hands, you have to stop, breathe. What has led us to unsustainability was trying to put inside
everything that is outside us. This does not sate” (Nogueira 2016:B3).

Notes
I want to thank Michael Scott for the opportunity to present a version of this article in a
seminar held by the Department of Anthropology at the London School of Economics on
July 26, 2012. Another version, entitled “Maussian Inalienability and Marxist Alienation: A
Contrast,” was presented in November 2013 in the symposium, “Beyond Engagement:
Papers Inspired by the Work of Terence Turner,” at the 112th Annual Meeting of the
American Anthropological Association. I presented another version to the Working Group,
“A New Anthropological View on the Economy,” at the II Meeting of Mexican and
Brazilian Anthropologists, held in November 2013 at the University of Brasilia. I thank the
participants of these symposia for their comments. I also want to thank the fruitful
comments and suggestions made by the translator of this article from the Portuguese,
Catherine V. Howard, a colleague from the University of Chicago, who was also an advisee
of Terry Turner.
2 My proposal here differs from Turner´s, for whom “against both Mauss and Simmel, but
with Marx, exchange as it exists in any society must be understood in relation to the total
process of social production, circulation, and reproduction of which it forms but one
moment or aspect” (Turner 1989:260). On the other hand, Turner understood that, in
noncapitalist societies, “a form of circulation” can become “the form of social production
and reproduction in the most inclusive sense” (Turner 1989:262) and that “interests, values
of actors and properties of objects” can be “mediated by gift prestations” (Turner 1968:125).
1
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For example, in his reflections on the notion of “wages” Mauss (1950:253–254) recalls that
the French term gage comes from the Latin wadium, which he contrasts with the English
wage.
4 On the Latin traditio, see Mauss (2003:271–275).
5 My use of the concept of circulation owes a great deal to Turner´s ideas on “the relation
between the notion of exchange and that of circulation (two notions which are often
identified which should be kept analytically distinct)” (Turner 1989:263). Names, for instance, “or reputations, circulate but are not ‘exchanged.’” The ability of one's reputation to
circulate separately from oneself and independently of physical existence is established in
large part through successful exchanges, but is not itself an exchange. As Turner (1989:263)
further argued, “exchange is a concretized form of circulation, but circulation is a more
general relation of communication.” I show that this circulation is one of debts, and that
reciprocity does not necessarily involve the bilateral movements of objects, which LéviStrauss (1949) characterized simply as “restricted exchange.”
6 When Weiner (1992) attempts to present an alternative to Mauss in her analysis of inalienability in Oceania, she considers reciprocity to be “superficial” in comparison to “strategies of exchange.” This aspect of Weiner’s theory is criticized in Valeri (1994).
7 For discussion of tribute, consult Mauss (2003:146–7) on Madagascar; ibid.: 200 on
Melanesia and Polynesia; ibid.: 201 on Borneo; ibid.: 279 on India.
8 The Trobrianders call this prestation “pokala” (Malinowski 1953:181). For more on
Trobriand tribute, see Malinowski 1953:186, 193; see also: ibid.:153 on Trobrianders in
general; ibid.:61 on gifts from wife’s brother to sister’s husband; ibid.:63 on villages sending
tributes; ibid.:64 on a system of vassalage in which a woman from each village is given to the
chief (ibid.:153, 180). Along these lines, Polanyi cites the ethnography of Thurnwald on the
Banaro (along with that of Malinowski on the Trobriands and Firth on the Tikopians):
“Among Micronesian and Polynesian peoples, for instance, ‘the kings as the representatives
of the first clan, receive the revenue, redistributing it later in the form of largesse among the
population’” (Polanyi 2000:312 quoting Thurnwald 1932).
9 A point made by a Tipití reviewer.
10 “In this respect Sartre seems to have remembered only half of Marx's and Freud's
combined lesson. They have taught us that man has meaning only on the condition that he
view himself as meaningful. So far I agree with Sartre. But it must be added that this meaning
is never the right one: superstructures are faulty acts which have ‘made it’ socially” (Lévi-Strauss
1966:253–254, italics in the original).
11 This type of cross-cultural perspective is what Dumont (1967), following De Tocqueville,
called “apperception,” and which Merleau-Ponty (1962) also saw as anthropology’s great
contribution.
12 I emphasize the word “liberate” to move closer to Dumont’s (1977) understanding of
freedom (and of emancipation) as fundamental categories in both liberal and Marxist
thought.
13 Scubla (2011) argues that Lévi-Strauss, after deconstructing totemism and religion, ended
up reintroducing the second through the canonical formula, in a sort of “return of the
repressed.”
14 I again recall Dumont´s (1977) approximation between Marx and liberal thinking through
individualistic concepts such as “autonomy.” Is Lacan an individualist?
3
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